Hundreds of people gather in the Vedado neighborhood of Havana in mid-December amid escalating tensions with the United States, which has deployed military assets in Caribbean waters. The demonstrators also pledged support for now-arrested Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro. Photo by Ernesto Mastrascusa/EPA
Political uncertainty in Cuba intensified this week after U.S. forces captured Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro and after Secretary of State Marco Rubio warned that the government in Havana “is in serious trouble” and that its leaders “should be concerned.”
In his remarks, Rubio underscored the involvement of Cuban officials in the security and intelligence apparatus of the Venezuelan government, reinforcing the perception that Havana faces a scenario of increased external pressure at a time of pronounced internal fragility.
Although analysts and academics consulted by UPI largely rule out a direct U.S. military intervention on the island in the short term, they agree that the new regional context opens the door to an intensification of economic, diplomatic and strategic pressure, taking advantage of the weakening of Cuba’s main allies and the shift in power in Venezuela.
For Alberto Rojas, director of the Observatory of International Affairs at Finis Terrae University in Chile, developments in Caracas will have an immediate and profound impact on Havana.
“With the capture of Nicolas Maduro and the concessions made by Venezuela’s new government to Washington, Cuba loses its main ally in Latin America,” Rojas said.
Rojas said one of the most sensitive effects would be a potential cut in Venezuelan oil supplies, a key factor in Cuba’s economic survival over the past two decades.
“The most likely scenario is that this flow changes, declines or even stops altogether, which could trigger an even more severe energy crisis,” he warned. Cuba currently faces daily power outages of between five and nine hours in Havana, directly affecting quality of life, economic activity and strategic sectors such as tourism.
From this perspective, Maduro’s removal represents not only a political loss for Havana, but also a material one. Unlike Venezuela, Cuba lacks strategic natural resources that could attract direct economic interest from Washington, limiting its room for maneuver and making it more vulnerable to external pressure.
Political scientist Federico Merke, an academic at the University of San Andres in Argentina, agrees that a shift in Venezuela automatically intensifies pressure on Cuba.
“It remains to be seen whether this translates into zero oil for the island. In any scenario, there are greater chances that Cuba’s situation will worsen,” Merke told UPI, drawing a direct link between Venezuelan politics and Cuba’s vulnerability.
Merke said Cuba’s economy is in an especially fragile position, with little capacity to absorb new external shocks.
“Cuba’s economy is at its worst point since the Special Period following the end of the Cold War,” said Martin Schapiro, a former Argentine undersecretary for international strategic affairs, agreeing that any change in the relationship with Caracas would have an “enormous” impact on the island.
Political scientist Rut Diamint of Argentina’s Torcuato di Tella University reinforced that assessment.
“That would further complicate Cuba’s economy, which was already severely deteriorated,” she said, noting that social deterioration and internal discontent have become structural features of the current Cuban landscape.
Despite this adverse context, Diamint said she considers a direct U.S. military intervention unlikely.
“If the United States had wanted to intervene in Cuba, it would have already done so,” she said, noting that the Cuban government maintains tighter internal control than Venezuela and lacks allied actors that could facilitate an externally driven transition.
Still, she introduced an element of uncertainty.
“Trump is unpredictable,” she said.
Schapiro said he shares a similar view, ruling out a ground invasion similar to the 2003 war in Iraq, but not excluding other forms of coercion.
“An increase in pressure combined with blocking any possibility for Venezuela to supply energy does not seem unlikely to me, and I think it is a form of imposing force that could be explored far more than a direct military intervention,” Schapiro said.
In that sense, experts agree Washington could opt for limited operations, reinforced sanctions and deterrence measures without moving toward a prolonged occupation.
“Trump continues to favor brief and effective military actions, not occupation,” Merke said, warning that invading Cuba would amount to “buying a problem rather than a solution.”
From Chile, former Foreign Minister Heraldo Munoz said he also considers a military intervention unlikely in the short term.
“The agreement reached after the missile crisis not to intervene again in Cuba remains in place and an action of that kind would also create more problems for Trump with Congress,” Munoz said.
However, he warned that the new U.S. national security strategy reflects Washington’s intent to impose its will in the region, prioritizing economic interests and geopolitical control over the explicit promotion of democracy.
Munoz noted that in recent U.S. strategic documents, the word “democracy” is largely absent from the chapter on the Western Hemisphere, a signal that was also evident in Washington’s handling of the Venezuelan case.
From Havana, the assessment is different and more confrontational.
Raul Rodriguez, director of the Center for Hemispheric and U.S. Studies at the University of Havana, said he anticipates a tightening of what he described as “economic warfare” as the main tool of pressure.
“The United States will focus on intensifying economic warfare, cutting off as much external financing as possible and obstructing efforts at diversification,” Rodriguez said.
Rodriguez argued that Washington has failed to build a credible narrative to justify direct military action against Cuba, unlike it did in Venezuela under the banner of fighting narcoterrorism.
In his view, attempts to link the island to Chinese bases or significant military cooperation with Russia have failed to gain sufficient international traction. Still, he did not rule out indirect confrontation scenarios.
“One should not underestimate the predatory nature of U.S. imperialism,” Rodriguez warned, saying Washington’s ultimate objective would remain regime change through nontraditional means such as extraterritorial economic pressure and diplomatic isolation.
Beyond the international dimension, several analysts stress that Cuba is also a matter of domestic politics in the United States.
For Rojas, the issue holds particular importance for Rubio for both personal and electoral reasons.
“For Rubio, pushing forward the fall of the Cuban regime is a historic banner and also a political asset,” he said, referring to the secretary of state’s potential future ambitions within the Republican Party.
Merke and Schapiro agree the region would likely react in a limited way to any further hardening of U.S. policy.
“The region did little or nothing about Venezuela, and I think it would do little or nothing about Cuba,” Merke said, noting that regional mechanisms are weakened and that most governments face internal crises that constrain their ability to respond.
